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Ten Years of the EEC's Generalized System of Preferences for
Developing Countries; Success or Failure?*
Introduction
Treating unequal partners in world trade unequally has been
one of the major targets of the Group of 77 in the interna-
tional trading order for about two decades. Thus, the OECD
countries were urged to improve the market access conditions
for the developing countries' non-traditional exports unila-
terally, that means without any obligation for the develop-
ing countries to lower their tariffs on imports from deve-
loped countries.
These so-called generalized preferences violated the GATT
principle of non-discrimination. Non-discrimination, how-
ever, implied that tariff concessions were negotiated be-
tween the principle suppliers of goods, in most cases the
developed countries, in order to achieve a maximum of reci-
procal economic compensation for own concessions.
Developing countries as the lesser suppliers sat at the
side-table and took the free-rider position. Urging for
generalized preferences meant to make this implicit free-
rider position explicit.
With the beginning of the seventies the Group of 77 formally
succeeded in receiving preferences from OECD countries.
Whether the preferences have stimulated the developing coun-
tries' manufactured exports during the last decade can be
analysed at best by discussing principles and operations of
the oldest GSP scheme, that of the. European Economic Commu-
nity
1.
* This paper draws upon a preliminary version of the au-
thor's contribution to a wider research project on "Partici-
pation of Developing Countries in the International Trading
System" launched by the Trade Policy Research Centre, London,
Comments made by Ulrich Hiemenz were most helpful.- 2 -
Description of the EEC Scheme
The EEC scheme was the first of the OECD countries' unilate-
ral concessions to be introduced on 1 July 1971. Its imple-
mentation underwent gradual changes over the following de-
cade, whereas its fundamentals remained the same: a full
tariff exemption for most of the beneficiaries' exports of
semi-manufactures and manufactures (CCT 25 - 99) under va-
rious preconditions and within certain product- and country-
specific annually fixed limits, a full or partial tariff
exemption for some processed agricultures (CCT 1 - 24) under
similar restrictions as for CCT 25 - 99 items, and a country
coverage, which comprised the Group of 77 countries plus
some dependent territories whose customs administrations
were authorized to issue origin certificates. After the EEC
enlargement the UK, Denmark and Ireland abandoned their
national schemes and converted to the EEC scheme on 1
January 1974.
This scheme, which was initially based on a GATT accorded
ten-years waiver of MFN treatment and hence subject to rene-
wal of the tariff exemptions each calender year, was exten-
ded to a further period of ten years in December 1980. If
was thus brought in line with the replacement of the GATT
waiver by an enabling clause on permanent differential
treatment in the Tokyo Round as well as with the third UN
development decade.
Product coverage: In the realm of semi-manufactures and
manufactures only few items (unwrought mineral raw materials
through the ingot stage, waste and scraps, some processed
agricultures) are exempted from GSP treatment. In these
items where MFN duties were greater zero, the EEC took ac-- 3 -
count of vested interests of competing suppliers from Afri-
can associates. About 96 percent of all semi- manufactures
and manufactures have been GSP items from the beginning
contrasting to processed agricultures where the EEC raised
the number of GSP items from 145 in 1971 to 338 in 1983
(about 74 percent of all items). The fact that the greatest
improvements in the product coverage were achieved between
1975 and 1977 (296 items) reflects the intention to compen-
sate Asian Commonwealth countries for the loss of Common-
wealth preferences which expired by 1978.
Depth of tariff cut; The preference margins, which GSP bene-
ficiaries enjoy vis-a-vis non-beneficiaries equals the com-
mon external tariff in semi-manufactures and manufactures
where full tariff exemption is granted. In this category the
import value-weighted average preference margin for all
items amounted to 9.6 percentage points in 1976. They were
the highest for the so-called sensitive textiles (14.6 per-
centage points). Ranging the margins according to the degree
of sensitivity (which is explained below) yields the follow-
ing list: 14.6 percent for sensitive textiles, 12.1 percent
for all sensitive products, 8.9 for all semi- sensitive
products, 7.8 percent for all non-sensitive products and 6.8
2 percent for all agricultures .
Beneficiaries: In selecting the countries under GSP status,
the EEC considered the Group of 77 membership as terms of
reference (the so-called self-selection process). Thus,
preferential treatment was denied to Taiwan and Israel and
granted to Yugoslavia. Besides this group China and Romania
were included in the list of beneficiaries in 1980 and 1974
respectively. For cotton textiles and substitutes the EEC
confined the beneficiary status to those developing coun-
tries being contracting parties to the LTA (Long Term Ar-
rangement Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles). Since 1980
the Community links preferential treatment for products
subject to the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) with bilateral- 4 -
"voluntary" export self-restraints with the Community for
these products . In 1980 twenty-one countries and.dependent
territories (including Romania) plus nine LLDCs outside the
ACP group were granted preferential treatment for MFA pro- .
4
ducts . Applications from member states' or third countries'
dependent territories were approved if the above-mentioned
origin certificate condition was met.
Hence, in 1983 125 independent countries were GSP benefi-
ciaries. Sixty-three of them enjoyed special preferences
under the ACP agreement and nine other mostly Mediterranean
countries under bilateral agreements. These countries have
the option of claiming preferential treatment under either
system and thus choosing the more favourable one. In most
cases special preferences have been at least equivalent in
manufactures and far better in agricultures. Special rules
in the GSP fixed in 1977 provided additional preferences for
those least developed countries (LLDCs), which did not
belong to the ACP group. For these countries the GSP product
range has been extended to products like raw coffee and
cocoa beans. Furthermore safeguards like ceilings and other
quantitative restrictions under the GSP have been lowered
for the LLDCs. It goes without saying that viewed against
the background of the very low competitiveness of LLDCs in
manufactures on world markets even a more open-ended GSP
scheme has little economic impact.
Safeguards: The manifold safeguards in the EEC scheme de-
serve most attention since the critics on how the scheme
works in practice focus on them. The scheme is often cri-
ticized as closed-ended and hence of little impact on trade
flows in those goods where some developing countries have
revealed clear comparative advantages and as highly discri-
minitary because of arbitrary "divide and rule" policies
towards the group of beneficiaries.
Besides a general escape clause for processed agricultures
similar to that of Article XIX of the GATT a lot of a priori
limitation formulas exist for semi-manufactures and manufac-
tures.- 5 -
For each GSP item a ceiling is annually calculated on the
basis of trade flows about three to four years ago. The sum
of all ceilings denotes the annual "GSP offer" of the EEC.
What is essential is the whether imports exceeding the ceil-
ings face MFN treatment either automatically of faculta-
tively or not at all.
To be brief, ceilings have not been relevant for non-sen-
sitive items. These are products where imports are not as-
sumed to threaten domestic production and employment. Ceil-
ings on these products are not published and in the seven-
ties member countries did not request a reimposition of
duties under a general safeguard clause. In practice duty-
free treatment for non-sensitive items is open-ended pro-
vided that administrative conditions (origin rules, correct
formulas etc.) are met and that importers apply for GSP
treatment at the customs.
The next category, the so-called semi-sensitive items exist-
ed until 1981. It included imports in bordercase items which
were assumed to disrupt the domestic market eventually.
Ceilings were therefore facultative and partly under sur-
veillance so that imports beyond the ceilings frequently
faced MFN treatment at request of member states. Conse-
quently a considerable amount of uncertainty on the sort of
tariff treatment prevailed in this category which was aban-
doned for all industrial products except textiles in 1981.
However, since most of the former semi-sensitive items
became "sensitive", the most restrictive form of administra-
ting a ceiling, the surveillance was not lowered, just the
contrary. In the sensitive items, which comprise goods
competing strongly with domestic substitutes, the ceiling
takes the form of a tariff quota. Those imports exceeding
the quota automatically face MFN treatment. In addition, the
tariff quota for each sensitive item is divided into fixed
member state shares, so that GSP imports in a member state
whose share is exhausted are only possible via another- 6 -
member state whose share is not yet exhausted. These indi-
rect imports cause additional costs and are only profitable
if the additional costs are lower than the tariff saving. In
practice indirect imports are frequently made, not only
because of the GSP, but also because of short-term adjust-
ments to changing marketing decisions on the wholesale
level. In fact, the free circulation of goods within the EEC
makes member state shares costly but ultimately useless. In
recent times a community reserve allows for some inter-
member state allocations of shares.
A further limitation, the maximum amount rule or "butoir",
is based on one of the essential perceptions of GSP admini-
strators that is "differentiation". It simply means cutting
down the share of the cake (the strictly limited GSP offer
in sensitive items particularly) eaten by the most compe- .
titive suppliers among the beneficiaries in order to guaran-
tee some pieces of the cake for the smaller suppliers or the
LLDCs. Till 1980 the butoir which denoted the maximum
share of a ceiling which an individual beneficiary could use
ranged between 50 percent for non-sensitive items and .15
percent for "hydrid" products. The latter category was charac-
terized by some products, where few major suppliers frequent-
ly hit the normal butoir. In practice the butoir was often
exceeded before the MFN tariff was reimposed. This happened
because of time-lags in the information process between the
member states and the EEC commission.
Since 1981 tariff quotas and butoirs are combined in a new.
sub-category of very sensitive items, where some competitive
developing countries have been granted individual idential
tariff quotas, not as a share but in absolute amounts. These
amounts are again sub-divided into member state shares and
strictly obligatory. Other GSP suppliers of very sensitive
items face facultative ceilings and so do all GSP benefi-
ciaries in another sub-category of less sensitive items .
One can conclude from these changes that the anti-major
supplier bias in special safeguards has been enforced at the
beginning of the second GSP decade. This corresponds to the- 7 -
intention of the EEC both to limit the GSP offer in sensi-
tive items and to approach an "equal" distribution of this
limited offer as far as possible.
Administrative constraints: Administrative constraints are
said to be a major deterrent against a high share of imports
in GSP-covered items which actual receive preferential
treatment. Preferences are by no means automatically granted
by the importing country's customs authorities. Instead they
are bound to origin rules, which are typically restrictive
in goods where domestic producers' interests are vested ,
and to direct shipping requirements. The relevant documents
have to be filled in by the exporter and have to be certi-
fied by authorized authorities in the exporting country. If,
as it happened in China in 1980 and partly still in 1981,
the correct origin certificate Form A is not available or
unknown respectively, all other discussions on safeguards
are redundant. GSP treatment will not be granted.
Administrative constraints simply follow from the basic
character of the GSP that is differential treatment, not.
only of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, but also of
more or less competitive beneficiaries. Thus, in order to
realize the notion that the world trading partners should be
divided into those who "need" a duty-free market access and
others who "need not", origin rules are applied. By nature,
GSP-induced export incentives and origin controls are inter-
dependent. High incentives provoke the faking of invoices
and the shipping of products to GSP beneficiaries which have
not yet "eaten their piece of the cake" in order to get
preferences after having made a final touch on the products
in that country. Stricter origin controls will automatically
follow, a costly and unproductive way of absorbing resources
and a way towards a growing inattractiveness of preferences
for those having comparative advantages in producing the
goods.- 8 -
Trade Effects of the EEC Scheme
Tackling the trade effects of the EEC scheme is possible by
answering three subsequent questions:
Firstly, which effects occur theoretically?
Secondly, how can one measure the effects empirically?
Thirdly, can we explain the results of measurement by look-
ing at the GSP in practice?
Trade effects in theory; To begin with, preferences may have
an impact on the volume of imports as well as on their re-
gional and sectoral structure. If the cut of tariffs on
imports from beneficiaries is transmitted to the consumer,
the relative import prices compared to prices for domestic
substitutes will fall thus shifting the demand from the
domestic substitute to imports. This direct static effect of
a tariff cut is called trade creation according to the tradi-
tional customs union theory. An indirect dynamic trade crea-
tion effect would occur if investments would be launched in
the beneficiary country in order to export under preferen-
tial conditions to the donor country. A discriminatory ta-
riff cut may additionally change the price ratio between
imports from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and thus
lead to a shift of demand from the latter to the former
sources. This effect is called trade diversion and affects
the regional structure of the donor country's imports.
The sectoral structure of imports will be changed if prefe-
rences contribute to reduce or even - in the case of a full
tariff exemption on intermediates and finished goods - eli-
minate the effective rate of protection of both categories. •
This would give developing countries having comparative
advantages for instance in labour-intensive finished goods a
competitive edge against those domestic suppliers whose
domestic value added is more effectively protected than it
is expressed by the nominal rate of protection. This holds
because of tariffs escalating with the stage of processing.
Theoretically, such a very important effect should arise in
the EEC, where with the exceptions of some processed agri-
cultures tariffs on intermediate and finished goods are
fully exempted in the GSP .- 9 -
Empirical measurement of trade effects: Turning to the
second question of empirical measurement, several approaches
are introduced in the following which have different refe-
rence systems (and have also different pitfalls). Firstly,
one may compare actual EEC imports "with GSP" with hypothe-
tical imports "without GSP" during the period in which the
EEC scheme operated. This is done in the first measure by
which the development of the EEC and US import market pene-
tration is compared for the 1972/75 period, when the US GSP
Q
scheme was not yet operating . On a country level such a
"with" and "without" comparison would also be applicable to
imports from Taiwan as a non-beneficiary and say South Korea
9
or Singapore as a beneficiary . Secondly, one may include
dummy variables reflecting the GSP status of a country in
cross-sectional regression analyses. These regressions
should explain bilateral trade flows between donor countries
on one hand and beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the
other hand by demand and supply conditions in both countries
as well as by trade resistance factors, besides the GSP
status. Calculated on a yearly basis before and after the
introduction of the GSP, the change of the estimated
coefficient of the dummy in an upward direction may signal
the growing intensity of trade between donor countries and
GSP beneficiaries over time (gravity-model approach)
A third method applies the traditional approach of measuring
trade creation as the percentage change in the price of
imports to the consumer caused by the tariff cut multiplied
by the price elasticity of demand for imports. This
percentage reduction in the price of imports is multiplied
by the initial value of imports from beneficiaries before
the introduction of the GSP. Under various assumptions on
the substitutability between imports from either beneficia-
ries or non-beneficiaries and domestic production trade
diversion would become trade creation multiplied by the
ratio between imports from non-beneficiaries and domestic
production
A fourth approach refers to the rigidity of the assumptions
on trade diversion estimates by trying to measure ex post- 10 -
elasticities of substitution between imports from privileged
and non-privileged sources.
Bearing the manifold apriori limitations of the EEC scheme
and their possibly discouraging effects on imports in mind,
one may finally introduce a fifth "plausibility" approach,
that is to refer to the actual amount of GSP-receiving im-
ports and to discuss whether it is reasonable to expect
trade creating and trade diverting effects as well as ef-
fects on investment at all under the above-discussed limi-
tations
EEC-US comparison during the pre-GSP period of the US
(1972-1975): Turning to the first approach we measure
changes in import-apparent consumption ratios in the EEC and
US/Canada between 1972 and 1975. Though the import pene-
tration ratios in manufacturing are rather similar in both
areas, the validity of such a comparison may of course be
questioned because of other divergencies in the two,areas'
demand patterns in general and during the covered period in
particular. Therefore, any conclusion from a comparison
should only tentatively be made, especially in view of the
short period and the possible difficulties in the EEC to
disseminate the GSP and get the scheme running.
To introduce the concept, gross trade creation is expected
to have emerged if the change in the share of imports from
developing countries the beneficiaries was larger in the EEC
than in the US during this period. On the other hand trade
diversion is assumed to have occurred if the change in the
share of imports from non-beneficiaries (the developed and
centrally planned economies) in apparent consumption was
larger in the US/Canada than in the EEC. A negative trade
diversion would indicate that EEC imports from non-benefi-
ciaries as a proportion of apparent consumption increased by
more (or declined by less) than the corresponding change in
the US/Canada context, thus indicating on effect contrary to
that one would expect under an effective GSP. This is just
what the results suggest (appendix table 1). On the average
US manufactured imports from the developing countries in-
creased by more under non-preferential conditions than did- 11 -
the corresponding EEC imports under the GSP. The pattern is
reverse in textiles and clothing where the GSP was restric-
tive from the very beginning as well as in rubber and non-
metallic minerals; two sectors, where the GSP did not play a
major role. With regard to imports from non-beneficiaries
the results yield that EEC imports from non-beneficiaries
either increased by more or declined by less than in the
US/Canada. Hence, the less favorable treatment did not deter
non-beneficiaries from penetrating into the EEC market more
rapidly than did the same group of countries in the US mar-
ket under relatively better conditions. To conclude, a GSP
effect in the theoretically expected direction of positive
trade creation and diversion effects does not emerge from
applying this approach.
The gravity-model approach: The second empirical concept,
the so-called gravity-model approach, has been tested by
Sapir (1981) with SITC data for the EEC during 1967 and
1978. He came out with the result that the dummy variables
reflecting the GSP status of an exporting country in bilate-
ral trade flows were statistically significant only in 1973
and 1974. Somewhat better results were achieved for disaggre-
gated trade flows in the SITC 7 and 8 categories.
This test has again been applied for the 1978-80 period with
a smaller sample of bilateral trade flows (140 instead of
180 in Sapir's study) and some other minor modifications.
The major difference to the reference study, however, is
that instead of SITC data BTN total import data of only
those manufactures were used, which were imported under the
GSP (appendix table 2). The data were disaggregated by sen-
sitivity categories in order to test the theoretically
expected hypothesis that the beneficiary status leaded - if
at all - to more intensive trade flows in non-sensitive than
in sensitive items.
The results do not give much rise to a positive assessment
of GSP trade effects. For all GSP items the dummy reflecting
the GSP status is significantly negative throughout the
three years. The same outcome emerges for the individual- 12 -
categories except for non-sensitive agricultures where the
GSP effect is indeterminate. There is only one major devia-
tion from this pattern (sensitive textiles, 1980) where the
coefficient turned to be significantly positive. This is
the more surprising as the explanatory power of the in-
dependent variables was by far the weakest in this heavily
protected category for the two other years. However, in
general, trade relations between the EEC and the other we-
stern industrial countries which did not receive preferen-
tial treatment proved to be still more intensive at the end
of the seventies than trade with the major GSP beneficia-
ries.
There are several factors explaining this result:
- the free trade arrangements between the EEC and former
EFTA countries in manufactures,
- the importance of neighbour trade in Europe reflected by
the overall negative sign of the trade resistance proxy in
the gravity model, ,. .
- the positive impact of high income levels, both in export-
ing and importing countries on bilateral trade flows
fostering intra-industry specialization,
- the quantitative restrictions in standardized and labour-
intensive consumer goods facing successful LDC suppliers
on European markets and
- the still rather limited product spread of these suppliers
compared to the wide range of products in intra-DC trade.
To be brief, though the GSP covers airplanes, computers,
cars and other high technology machinery, preferences do not
at all affect the developed countries' competitiveness in
these products. This is just what is expressed in the gravity
model. Furthermore, some developed countries, such as the
US, practice marginal cost pricing on EEC markets for simple
mass consumer goods (t-shirts), because of excess capacities
in domestic production, and can therefore compete with LDC
suppliers.
The traditional trade creation measurement: The third ap-
proach, measuring trade creation traditionally via tariffBibUothek dea Institute
Waltwirtachaft Kid
- 13 -
cuts and price elasticities of demand, does not construct
the antimonde world "without GSP", but simply assumes that
the GSP tariff cut will result in an equivalent import price
cut under the small country assumption (no change of export
prices) and will thus raise the imports from beneficiaries
above their initial level before the introduction of prefe-
rences.
Following this approach and under the assumption of no MFN
tariff reduction Baldwin/Murray (1977) estimated trade crea-
tion effects in the range of twenty-two to twenty-five per-
cent of 1971 EEC imports of GSP products.
Notwithstanding the assumptions on the size of price ela-
sticities of demand, these estimates must be questioned be-
cause of the lacking data base on EEC GSP-receiving imports
prior to 1973. In this year the EEC started to record GSP-
receiving imports. Prior to 197 3 only data on GSP-covered
imports (total imports from GSP beneficiaries in GSP tariff
items, Baldwin/Murray's base) and GSP-eligible imports (GSP-
covered imports coming within the tariff quotas in sensitive
items and the ceilings in semi-sensitive and non-sensitive
items, shortly the preference offer) were available.
Therefore, the first year to start with trade creation esti-
mates should be 1973. In this year GSP-covered imports, GSP-
eligible imports and GSP-receiving imports amounted to
EUAl790m, EUA1250m and EUA610m respectively. That means that
only 34 percent of GSP-covered imports in 1973 actually
received GSP treatment (Borrmann et al., 1979, table 27, p.
89). Since more than 50 percent of the 1973 GSP-receiving
imports referred to non-sensitive products there must be
other reasons than apriori limits which explain this low
share. Some of these reasons are discussed below.
Turning to the trade creation measurement, Baldwin/Murray's
estimates hold under the assumptions of an average GSP pre-
ference margin of about 10 percentage points and an average
14 price elasticity of demand of about -2.5. However, only- 14 -
about one-third of GSP-covered imports benefited from the
tariff cuts and thus consumers could enjoy import price re-^
ductions only for this share of GSP-covered imports. The
relative import price reduction multiplied by the price ela-
sticity should therefore be further multiplied by this share
so that GSP-induced trade creation would be reduced to about
eight percent of GSP-covered imports.
With regard to trade diversion, Baldwin/Murray did not
estimate elasticities of substitution between imports from
GSP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries but instead calcu-
lated trade diversion as trade creation weighted by the
share of imports from non-beneficiaries to domestic pro-
duction. These estimates should be therefore revised too. By
considering the relation between GSP-covered and GSP-
receiving imports total trade expansion (trade creation plus
trade diversion) would only be in the range of eight to nine
percent of GSP-covered imports instead of twenty-three to
twenty-five percent.
Elasticities of substitution; The second-best character of
the trade diversion measurement leads us to the fourth con-
cept, that is to estimate elasticities of substitution be-
tween EEC imports from GSP beneficiaries and non-benefi-
ciaries. Here, the pitfall emerges that one has to rely on
import unit values and quantities because of lacking market
price data. However, if the estimates are based on indivi-
dual non-sensitive GSP items (on the 4- or 6-digit BTN
level) instead of on baskets and indexes, the shortcomings
of this approach seem to be less serious .Such an approach
has been pursued in the following. Sensitive or semi-sensi-
tive products were excluded from the sample because of both
the quantitative restrictions, which were assumed to suppress
consumer reactions to changing price ratios, and the low
share of duty-free trade in total trade.
The estimate in fact reveals a theoretically plausible and
statistically significant elasticity of substitution (-1.10)
between EEC imports from beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries according to changes in relative prices which- 15 -
occurred between 1970 and 1972, when the preferences were
introduced. A ten percent reduction of relative prices on
imports from beneficiaries due to the average preference
margin would thus have resulted in an eleven percent in-
crease in import quantities from beneficiaries in relation
to import quantities from non-beneficiaries.
The crucial question still rests, whether this empirical ,
observation has its roots in the preferences. In view of the
conceptual shortcomings (lacking data on market prices,
possible product heterogeneity, overlap with simultaneously
happened price changes ruled by other determinants than
tariff changes) scepticism is justified. As the observed
elasticity seems to be rather small in view of the two years
period, so is trade diversion.
In general, this result may especially hold for the EEC,
which has established extensive free trade arrangements in
manufactures with the EFTA countries, so that as major non-
beneficiaries and relevant supplier of manufactures only
Japan and the USA emerge. Since the overlap between the ma-
nufactured export supply of these two countries and of the
beneficiaries is likely to be low given the different re-
source endowments, one may argue that the trade expansion
effects of the EEC GSP scheme are based - if at all - on
trade creation.
The "plausibility" concept: The shortcomings which are
inherent to all empirical antimonde concepts of measuring
GSP trade effects give rise to more intuitive "plausibility"
reasoning by looking at the GSP in operation. In addition to
the HWWA benchmark survey for the 1973/76 period, disaggre-
gated EEC data on these imports are available since 1978,
for some individual EEC member countries since 1973, for in-
stance for West Germany. These are the sources which under-
lie the following discussions. Priority is given to the
period since 1978 in order to account for lacking disse-
mination of the scheme among the importers in earlier years.
The most important feature to be drawn from these data is
that the above-mentioned one third share of GSP-receiving- 16 -
imports in GSP-covered imports for 1973/76 did not rise over
time (appendix table 3), though the scheme became more
disseminated. The share fluctuated between 27 percent and 33
percent for all products during 1978-81. The data also re-
veal that there are large differences in this share accord-
ing to individual EEC member countries (to be discussed
below) and to different GSP categories. The latter ones
deserve our attention, for the preferences have not always
be used more extensively in non-sensitive than in the
restricted sensitive items. In the largest category, the
non-sensitive industrial products (except textiles), where
limitations should not matter, preferences were also used
only by one third in general. The fact that by 1981 most
semi-sensitive items were placed in the sensitive category
accounts for the jump of the share in sensitive industrial
products. Utilisation rates are better in non-sensitive
agricultures and especially in non-sensitive textiles. How-
ever, even in the latter category, where relatively high
preference margins act as an incentive to apply for preferen-
tial treatment, the GSP was used only by less than three
quarters. Very low shares of GSP-receiving imports in sensi-
tive industrial items prior to 1981 and in sensitive textiles
throughout the period reflect the marginal value of the GSP
given the strict tariff quotas in these categories.
These findings support Cooper's above-cited assumption that
there is no trade effect at all in the case where imports
exceed the quotas. There seems to be a strong case for
arguing that most of the beneficiaries
1 exports to the EEC
in privileged items became possible under MFN- and not under
GSP-conditions. This would mean that the EEC GSP scheme did
not contribute to reduce the costs of marginal imports and
hence did not provide a direct trade incentive at the
margin. Instead it allowed for some "windfall" profits on
intra-marginal imports to be used sometimes - as West German
traders underlined - for lowering the prices of marginal
imports. It is likely but not evident that importers apply a
"mixed pricing" between imports receiving preferences and
others which do not, so that an indirect GSP trade incentive
may occur at the margin. Some importers argued that this is- 17 -
done especially for cheap products and special offers, where
the price for the consumer is the main, if not sole determi-
nant of retail trade competition.
The low share of GSP-receiving imports also depreciates the
effect of the GSP on lowering effective rates of protection.
In some cases of agricultures where intermediates, for ex-
ample fish meal, are imported duty-free and where the fi-
nished good (beef) is excluded from the GSP, the effective
rate of protection of this good even increases.
The reasons for these major results from the GSP in opera-
tion are manifold and point to far ranging restrictions in
the administration of preferences. On the other hand, im-
porters stress that especially in high quality products as
well as in fancy goods requiring a lot of marketing flexibi-
lity, the price is only one among various other determinants
of market success. A cost-benefit comparison between the
indispensable delays in customs clearance asssociated with
the application of preferential treatment and the preference
margin of mostly less than ten percent of the cif-price
would therefore often lead to the decision in favour of a
rapid, but dutiable market access. In addition, the more
diversified and less organized the wholesale and retail
market would be, the more often it would happen that wrong
customs formulas are filled in by small importers and ex-
porters, leading automatically to the denial of preferential
treatment.
Dynamic trade effects of the GSP: Did the EEC GSP scheme
encourage the establishment of foreign direct investments in
beneficiary countries exporting to the home country under
preferential conditions? It goes without saying that prefe-
rences may influence investment decisions at the margin, but
fail to be the only determinant to invest. Quantifying this
marginal contribution by interviewing the investors is hardly
promising, since the numerous quantitative and qualitative
aspects cannot be made equivalent and comparable. The weight
of preferences in the investment decision finds it parallel
in the relevance of export-processing zones or more general/- 18 -
free zones in developing countries offering tax holidays.
The considerable differences in the success of free zones
throughout the developing countries underline that tax holi-
days are only a complement to other macro- and micro- eco-
nomic resources available in the host country and are inef-
fective without them. In this regard duty holidays conceded
by the importing country could be a further stimulant to
export processing zones. However, the restrictive origin
rules in the EEC GSP disqualify many offshore assembly acti-
vities for GSP treatment.
Additionally, those export-oriented investments which take
the GSP into account, claim for stable export market access
conditions during the pay-off period. The discretionary
element in the EEC GSP to concede preferences,for each pro-
duct unilaterally year by year does not meet this claim.
Though the reformed EEC GSP since 1982 provides some
stability over a four-years period, no EEC country govern-
ment can give a legally binding guarantee that an indi-
vidual product exported from an individual GSP beneficiary
country will be granted the same GSP treatment during this
period. This especially holds for products exported by the
advanced suppliers. The export dynamism of these suppliers
induced the Commission to make a difference between the
general medium-term framework of the scheme and its detailed
implementation to be adjusted annually. Thus, for an
investor who decides on a production plant for an individual
product in a specific developing country, the uncertainty
of market access has not been reduced by the reformed GSP.
Especially in highly price-elastic goods this may shift the
investment risk above the tolerable level . The higher the
degree of sensitivity of the product is and the more
successful the beneficiary export expansion is, the higher
this uncertainty will be. An export-oriented investment in
non-sensitive products like Volkswagen in Mexico exporting
car equipment and the "beetle" to West Germany under GSP
conditions is therefore far less affected by the uncertainty
than the foreign investments in standardized labour-
intensive consumer industries or in steel.- 19 -
The Distribution of the Benefits from the EEC Scheme
By discussing the benefits from the GSP and its distribu-
tion, two effects within the static framework have to be
separated, the welfare effects (trade expansion as the sum
of trade creation and trade diversion) and the income distri-
bution effect, that is the amount of tariff revenues forgone
pocketed either by the importer or the exporter. One may
further look upon welfare effects either from the world's or
the individual country's point of view. In the former view
trade expansion may give rise to a negative evaluation of
its welfare content if it is mainly composed of trade diver-
sion, whereas in the view of the beneficiary this impact is
positive. Talking on distributional aspects in the EEC frame-
work should include an evaluation of the "burden sharing" dis-
cussion among EEC members since unilateral trade liberaliza-
tion also involves the above-mentioned two points of view.
In this respect unilateral trade liberalization of an in-
dividual country may be politically unacceptable if all
other countries are mercantilist and nationalist
To begin with, the inter-beneficiaries' distribution of both
GSP-receiving imports and MFN dutiable imports in GSP items
in 1973 and 1981 allow for some insight which countries
could have gained from the EEC GSP (appendix table 4). It is
interesting to note that the ranking list of the ten largest
suppliers under GSP conditions underwent considerable
changes during the eight years under consideration. Whereas
Yugoslavia held the top rank in 1973 (about one third of the
EEC GSP-receiving imports), the country has disappeared from
the 1981 list. Instead, Romania whose status as a developing
country can be questioned and Brazil moved upwards followed
by the export phalanx of East/Southeast Asian countries. The
cases of Iran in 1973 as well as of Romania, Venezuela and
Saudi Arabia in 1981 witness that the GSP covers products
like some medium and heavy oils or petroleum gases (MFN
tariff 1.5 percent!) which hardly suffer from market access
barriers. With these products the EEC blows up its "GSP
offer" without stimulating trade.- 20 -
In general, the ranking list exhibits a growing number.of
countries mainly from the Asian sphere participating in the
GSP, so that the ten largest suppliers accounted only for
about two third of all GSP-receiving imports in 1981 com-
pared to more than 86 percent eight years ago. What seems to
be more relevant is the extent to which the countries
1 GSP-
covered exports actually received preferential treatment. In
this respect the countries range between two poles. The one
pole is set by a country like Venezuela (to less extent
Romania too) whose GSP-covered exports in total receive
preferences. Such a country exports only non-sensitive pro-
ducts (in the extreme case only oil derivates), has no
problems with origin rules and distributes its products by .
GSP experienced traders. The other pole is a country like ^
Hongkong, exporting a lot of sensitive products with
strictly applied limits to duty-free access, and facing
origin rules which disqualify many of its GSP-covered ex-
18 ports for GSP treatment
The other countries are in between these poles with South
Korea ranging next to Hongkong. Comparing the two poles
makes clear which gains would be theoretically achievable if
the EEC would not discriminate the export supply of a
country like Hongkong against the supply of a country like
Venezuela. There is no trade creation effect in the
Venezuela case because domestic substitutes do not exist for
a Ricardo good like oil derivates. Nor do trade creation
effects arise in the Hongkong case, where the GSP-covered
products do not qualify for GSP treatment, because the bene-
ficiary is fully integrated in the international division of
labour and imports intermediates from the cheapest source.
With respect to the welfare effect the Venezuela case re-
veals that even GSP-covered imports which are equal to GSP-
receiving imports do not guarantee for a GSP-induced welfare
increase via trade creation, if the comparative advantage is
mostly determined by the natural resource endowment of the
beneficiary.- 21 -
Turning to the income distribution effect, one may first
estimate the amount of tariff revenues forgone irrespective
of whether this amount is pocketed by the importer or trans-
ferred to the exporting countries. Under the assumption of a
zero price elasticity of demand in the relevant range and of
an average preference margin of ten percentage points, the
tariff revenue loss in 1981 amounted to about EUA850m, that
is the preference margin multiplied by the amount of GSP-re-
ceiving imports. To put this figure into perspective, it
equals 8.4 percent of total DAC development aid in 1981.
However, this is not the relevant reference system since it
is by no means guaranteed that this amount accrues to bene-
ficiary exporters. Theoretically this depends on the rela-
tion between price elasticities of demand and supply. In
practice an essential precondition of an aid transfer to the
exporting country would be that the exporter knows that
his product enters the EEC under GSP conditions. This is not
the case for sensitive items, which in 1981 accounted for 50
percent of total EEC GSP-receiving imports.
To quote an example: German importers order tiles from South
Korea, which is one of the "very sensitive" products with
country-specific tariff quotas. The South Korean exporter
fills in the right origin certificate, the products are
shipped to Hamburg in autumn and are stored there in a
bonded warehouse till January 2nd. They are then declared to
the customs but it is not until February that the individual
importer gets to know whether he was lucky to receive a
piece of the tariff quota which is usually exhausted for
this product within the first January week. The exporter in
South Korea does not receive any information about which
part of his exports to West Germany entered the market duty-
free. Under this scenario of uncertainty, the importer will
price the goods under MFN conditions, and he will look upon
the received preferences as an unexpected gift to be used
perhaps for subsidization of further sales by special offers
or discounts to the retail trade. There is no chance for the
exporter of sensitive goods to anticipate preferential treat-
ment and thus to raise his export prices in advance by the- 22 -
amount of the preference margin. Even if the uncertainty
would not exist in the case of tariff quotas preallocated to
traditional importers, the aid transfer to the exporter is
not likely to occur, given the ubiquitous nature of low-
priced sensitive goods and the high intensity of competition
on the markets of those goods. Typically buyers
1 market
conditions prevail so that the importers may rapidly replace
suppliers by one another. In economic terms, the small coun-
try assumption holds. For non-sensitive and non-standardized
products with open-ended ceilings the preconditions for an
aid transfer are certainly better, unless the indepen-
dent price bargaining between importers and exporters is
conditioned by transfer pricing. This could occur in intra-
firm trade such as in the Volkswagen case where.interme-
diates are exported to the parent company under GSP condi-
tions.
In general, the aid transfer element in the EEC GSP shrinks
to a guantite negligeable if we only take non-sensitive
products into account and if we assume that the tariff
revenues forgone are fully distributed to the individual GSP
beneficiaries. Under these conditions the aid transfer
accruing to Brazil, the largest exporter of non-sensitive.
GSP items, would have amounted to EUA45m in 1981, which in
fact are peanuts compared to the country's current account
deficit in the same year of US$13100m.
The mirror of the benefit sharing among beneficiaries is
that of the burden sharing among EEC members. One may argue
that without large benefits there is no burden to be shared.
However, this global macroeconomic view has been widely dis-
placed by the politicians' sectorally confined, view of job
losses in vulnerable industries and of an "equal" share of
each member in this burden. For that reason the EEC deter-
mined the global "absorptive capacity" of each member by
such crude criteria as population, GNP and foreign trade.
19 The member state shares formed from these criteria are
with few exceptions the same for all products. This of -
course does not hold in practice, where the shares differ by
products widely.- 23 -
Appendix table 5, which records the intra-EEC distribution
of GSP-receiving imports of sensitive and semi-sensitive
items in recent years, exhibits that there is no conformity
between the arbitrarily fixed shares and the distribution in
practice. Throughout.the 1978-81 period French imports fell
short of their share whereas West Germany, the UK and Italy
in some cases exceeded theirs. The extraordinarily high
share of Italy in sensitive industrial goods reflects the
country's imports of oil derivates from Romania, Venezuela
and the Netherlands Antilles and should therefore be re-
garded separately. Too much should not be made from this
distribution although different national interests and pro-
tectionist attitudes may have an influence on it. Thus,
France is evidently the proponent of a rather restrictive
way of applying preferences by paying tribute to strong
pressures of domestic entrepreneurs and of some ACP ex-
porters. The UK on the other hand has tried to continue its
world market orientation in agricultural products from the
pre-integration period.
If one adjusts these figures by differences in the domestic
market size of the members (that is by calculating duty-free
imports per GDP unit) it turns out that in 1981 West Germany
as well as the UK or the Benelux countries imported twice as
much as France in sensitive products including textiles. A
similar difference between France and the other EEC members
emerges if instead of the GNP the population is taken as the
numeraire. This pattern fits well into the observations
cited by insiders of EEC internal negotiations on the annual
GSP concession schedules. Here, the French delegates are cha-
racterized as being leading in introducing new restrictions
into the scheme in addition to their individual possibi-
lities to delay and to impede the customs clearance process
at the French borders. In this respect, the imitation effect
as well as the political tensions which arise from the dis-
crepancies between major and minor "bearers of burden" with-
in the Community give more rise to concern than the protec-
tionist attitudes of a single member country.- 24 -
Consequences of Administrative Rules for the Benefits from
the GSP
Administrative rules, under which the monitoring and control
of tariff quotas, ceilings, butoirs, origin rules and direct
shipping certificates have to be subsumed, are the most
crucial barrier to the effectiveness of the GSP. This cannot
be changed unless its underlying philosophy to suppress
successful suppliers in order to guarantee other pretendedly
competitive beneficiaries a piece of the cake is abondoned.
It would require a deeper insight of politicians into the-
allocative benefits of unilateral trade liberalization in
products where the beneficiaries have comparative advantages
instead of granting preferences in goods where tariffs are
redundant. Administrative rules are nothing else than
government interference into the regional and sectoral
structure of GSP-receiving trade according to politically
determined criteria such as an "equal distribution of bene-
fits" and the "burden sharing principle". Having already
discussed this above, one may mention another effect of
rules which are newly determined each calender year, that is
the effect on the temporal rhythm of trade and production.
Trading under preferences with closed-ended quotas is like a
game of hazard which has its heyday in January each year and
then slows down until the beginning of the next year. Pro-
duction and transportation may adjust to this rhythm by
closing production plants in developing countries for some
months in order to minimize storage and transportation costs
of sensitive items.
How rapid the exhaustion of tariff quotas for sensitive
items takes place in some cases under a greyhound system is
exemplified by the West German GSP-receiving imports in
sensitive items (appendix table 6). In 1982, for example,
Brazil had "eaten its guaranteed piece of the cake" in sen-
sitive textiles already by 94.7 percent within January. This
is admittedly an extreme example which no other country- 25 -
achieved. In general, country-specific tariff quotas in in-
dustrial products (excluding textiles) were almost com-
pletely exhausted by seven large exporting countries in the
course of the year, but not within one month. Only in the
case of India the utilisation rate remained at a relatively
lower level (83.2 percent). Utilisation rates in textiles
were generally lower and fluctuated widely between the
countries which seems to be the consequence of the restric-
tive origin rules as discussed in the Hongkong case. During
1977 and 1982 the run on scarce tariff quotas became more
intensive due to the transition from normal butoirs (in per-
centages) to country-specific tariff quotas (in absolute
amounts).
Eroding preferences for successful suppliers and splitting
the Community into ten preference-conceding sub-areas in-
volves a further element of uncertainty and unattractiveness
for beneficiaries: the administrative rules are published
so late that the exporting countries cannot adjust to
changes compared to preceding years. It is not even possible
to get to know the exact GSP status and the rules for an in-
dividual product one week before the new scheme comes into
operation. Preferences for 1982, for example, were approved
by the Council on December 7, 1981, and were published in
detail in the Official Journal of December 21, 1981, which
itself came into public not before December 30, 1981, five
days before the run on tariff quotas for 1982 started. The
same happened for the 1983 preference scheme, which was
published in the Official Journal of December 23, 1982.
Though draft schedules of the Commission are available ear-
lier as recommendations they cannot be anticipated as final
decisions, since the Council uses to change details which
20 are essential for individual exporters
To be short, apart from the general doubtfulness of a
closed-ended scheme, rules are scheduled much too late by
the Council. They are highly discretionary and cannot be
extrapolated from the Commission's recommendations.- 26 -
Exporters and importers who have to decide on ordering,
shipping and storing much earlier in the year will therefore
decide under uncertainty in bordercase items and will
consequently set their prices under MFN conditions. A trade
expansion effect as mentioned already above is under such
conditions unlikely, at least indeterminate in the case
where importers subsidize marginal imports by preferences .
received on intra-marginal imports.
Conclusions
In essence, the EEC GSP scheme involves a "rational protec-
tionist's view of preferences" (Johnson), that is to con-
trol the amount and allocation of benefits through quotas
among the beneficiaries. Preferences for developing coun-
tries which proved to be competitive with products in which
the EEC countries have a visible comparative disadvantage
are frozen or even reduced. On the other hand, preferences
for developing countries which up to now failed to convert a
potential comparative advantage into a revealed comparative
advantage are extended. The initial pretension of the EEC to
establish a non-discriminatory preference scheme in the
sense that it would apply to all developing countries in the
same way, does not pass the test after a decade of enforced
discriminating operations against competitive beneficiaries.
The question whether the EEC GSP scheme proved to be a suc-
cess or failure, can be answered in the way that by no means
it has satisfied the objectives of those developing coun-
tries whose export-orientation strategies should have been
assisted by the EEC. During the first ten years of the
scheme two major tendencies in the EEC trade policy have
adversely affected the GSP: Firstly, the trend towards sec-
torally specified barriers against individual successful
suppliers. This trend has been fully incorporated in the GSP
reform of 1980 and seriously depreciates the scheme. Second-
ly, there is the shift from tariff barriers to non-tariff
barriers. Tariffs at the present level are no longer the
most crucial barriers to entry, and thus the GSP is no
longer- 27 -
the most efficient way to eliminate export disincentives on
the demand side. The first-best strategy to do so could be
to ease quantitative restrictions. However, just in those
textile sectors, where tariffs are still relatively high,
the GSP strenghtens non-tariff barriers by linking preferen-
tial treatment to export-self restraint commitments of indi-
vidual developing countries.
In short, the GSP of the eighties is a side aspect but not
the core of market access conditions. This does not exclude
that on a micro-level the GSP has some merits. It is on this
level where improvements along the lines of more open-ended
long-term guaranteed GSP conditions for individual products
from any beneficiary should be conceded. The perspectives of
reform should be the view of export-oriented investors in
developing countries who are engaged in a world-wide intra-
industry specialization and thus see themselves restricted
by the GSP origin rules in splitting the production process
inter-nationally. Furthermore the investors claim for stabi-
lity of GSP provisions during the pay-off period. This seems
to be a much more important investment determinant than a
preferential tariff of zero.
However, too much efforts in fighting protectionism should
not be invested in the GSP reform. This fight will be won or
lost on the field of non-tariff barriers, and here the
rapidly growing newly industrializing countries have a large
potential of reciprocity to offer.- 28 -
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where qig and q. are the quantities' of EEC imports from
all GSP beneficiaries i (less developed countries includ-
ing Yugoslavia excluding Taiwan) and all non-beneficia-
ries j (developed and centrally planned economies ex-
cluding Yugoslavia and including Taiwan) in the non-sen-
sitive manufactured product s, and P. and P. are the
unit values respectively. The indices 1 and 0 denote the
years 1972 and 1970. The estimate based on thirty-six
non-sensitive items exceeding a value of imports from GSP
beneficiaries of EUA2m in 1980, yielded the following
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Appendix Table 1 Estimated Trade Creation and Diversion by the GSP
in Manufacturing, 1972/73 to 1974/75, in Mill. US-g
Industry-
Gross Trade Creation'





















































































where GTC and TD denote gross trade creation and trade diversion res-
pectively, m denotes the ratio between imports from beneficiaries and
apparent consumption, m" denotes the ratio between imports from non-
beneficiaries (non-LDCs) and apparent consumption C, the indices o and
1 the years 1972/73 and 1974/75 average and the indices EC and US the
importing areas of the European Community (including UK, Ireland and
Denmark) and the USA plus Canada.
Source: Calculated from UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and De-
velopment Statistics, 1979 (New York 1979).- 34 -


























































































































































































































































































































^Estimated by the following trade flow equation :
a1 log Y± + a2 log Yj + a3 log N± + a4 logN. + a5 log D^ + ag P^
P
^ = the dollar value of i's exports to j (in thousands of EUA, EEC import value data were used) ; Y^ Y. = the nomi-
nal GNP of countries i and j in millions of US-dollars; N±, N. = the populations of countries i and j in millions; D±j =
the geographical distance between the comnercial centres of i and j in miles; P^
P = a duiroy variable for trade between
the EEC countries and GSP beneficiaries which takes values 1 and 0 to indicate the status of GSP beneficiary or non-benefi-
ciary of country i; log = refers to natural logarithms.
Exporting countries i, which are non-beneficiaries = Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwanandthe United States. Exporting countries i, which are beneficiaries = Argentina, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
Rcnania, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Yugoslavia. Importing countries j = West Germany, France, Italy, Benelux, UK,
Ireland and Denmark.
The values in parenthesis are t-statistics; an asterik means significant at the 5 percent level.
Vlevel insufficient for further computation in a step^ise regression analysis.- 35 -
Appendix Table 3 Percentage Share of GSP-Peceiving Imports in GSP Tariff Items, 1978 1981, by GSP Categories


































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Microfiche data provided by the Statistical Office of the European Camnunities.- 36 -

































































































Sources: Axel Bqrrmann et al., op.cit. - Statistical Office of the European Communities.- 37 -
Appendix Table 5 Share of EEC Member States in GSP-Receiving Imports of Sensitive













































































































































































































































































Sources: Eurostat, Microfiche Statistics.Appendix Table 6 : Utilisation Rate












































































Percentage share of GSP-receiving ircports in tariff quotas guaranteed for

















































































































Source: Federal Ministry of Economics, Bonn.